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Adding Complexity to Confusion and Seeing the 
Light: Feminist Legal Insights and the Jurisprudence 
of the Religion Clauses 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs t 
INTRODUCTION 
What is religious freedom and how does the government guarantee it? 
These are the questions with which the United States Supreme Court has 
struggled throughout its history of attempting to interpret the two religion 
clauses of the First Amendment. No one seems happy with the results. 1 To 
be fair to the Court, the words of the religion clauses are "at best opaque. "2 
The two clauses alternately prohibit the government from making a "law 
respecting an establishment of religion" and require that it not "prohibit[] the 
free exercise thereof. "3 These two guarantees create an inevitable tension. 4 
Often, what one clause appears to require , the other prohibits. 5 Without a 
clear and justifiable definition of religious freedom to guide interpretation, the 
Court's efforts to ensure the "preeminent goal of the First Amendment, "6 
government neutrality toward religion, will remain muddled. 7 
Feminist legal theory does not speak directly to the issue of religious 
freedom. It is, however, deeply concerned with defining and achieving gender 
freedom. The feminist experience of striving toward gender freedom informs 
efforts to define other types of freedom as well. Increasingly, the use of 
t Assistant Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. B.A. , 1982, 
Wesleyan University; J.D., 1985, University of Michigan. Thanks to Julie Davies, Joshua Dressler, J. 
Clark Kelso, Brian Landsberg, and Benjamin Wagner for providing helpful criticism on earlier drafts of 
this article. Thanks also to Spencer Skeen for his research assistance. 
1. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special: Reconsidering the Accomnu,dation of Religion 
Under the Religion ClausesojrheFimAmendmenr, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75, 75 (1990)(.Almosteveryone , 
including most of the present membership of the Supreme Court, is dissatisfied with the current state of 
constitutional law regarding church and state."); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom 
in Constitulional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. R:ev. 149, 225-26 (1991) ("[JJudicial decisions expounding 
and enforcing the Constitution's religion clauses are characterized by massive incoherence."). 
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4. See sources cited infra note 16. 
S. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. l, 18 (1989) (finding that Texas sales tax 
exemption for religious publications violates establishment clause, although free exercise clause could justify 
such exemptions where payment of tax would inhibit relieious activity); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 276 (1981) ("[S)tate interest .. . in achieving greater separation of church and state than is 
already ensured under the Establishment Clause ... is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case 
by the Free Speech Clause as well."). 
6. Edwatds v. Aillillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see aJsc cases cited infra 
note 21. 
7. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggreg01ed Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 
DEPAUL L. RBV. 993 (1990) (distinguishing different meanings of government neutrality toward religion); 
John T. Yalauri, The Concept of Neurra/iry in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Pm. L. Rsv. 83, 
84 {1986) (noting that no unifying conception of neutrality runs through establishment clause cases). 
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feminist legal insights extends beyond what have traditionally been considered 
"women's issues." 
Striking similarities exist between the Court's mission in interpreting the 
religion clauses and the challenge of developing feminist legal insights. Both 
the religion clauses and feminist legal insights grew out of experiences of 
exclus.ion and oppression. 8 A primary purpose of both the religion clauses and 
feminist legal theory is to guarantee a realm of freedom for all individuals. 
This purpose entails defining a sphere of protection for less powerful groups 
and individuals. The challenge, both for the Court in articulating a 
jurisprudence of the religion clauses and for feminists in developing legal 
insights, is to give meaning to the broad concept of freedom in light of current 
and changing historical circumstances and in light of diverse contemporary 
public perspectives as to the appropriate meaning of freedom. 
Because the jurisprudence of the religion clauses and feminist legal thought 
arise from a common experience and share a common goal, feminist legal 
insights provide assistance in interpreting the religion clauses. Applying 
feminist legal insights to the jurisprudence of the religion clauses leads to a 
number of specific conclusions. First, the Court's purported goal of ensuring 
the religious freedom for all that the religion clauses guarantee by demanding 
government "neutrality" toward religion is deceptive: neutrality has many 
possible meanings and any determination of a particular meaning depends 
initially on perspective. Second, the Court's chosen definition of neutrality 
depends upon baseline perceptions that reflect majority presumptions, and 
thereby validates government actions that have a disproportionate adverse effect 
on the religious freedom of minority religious groups and practitioners who 
do not share the majority presumptions. Third, feminist legal insights lead to 
a unique condemnation of this result. Rather than advocating the ambiguous 
concept of neutrality, feminist legal insights counsel that the goal of religious 
diversity should guide the Court's interpretation of the religion clauses. This 
approach represents an important shift in focus. It emphasizes the needs of 
more and less powerful religious groups and individuals to be able to pursue 
their different visions of religious freedom, rather than the need to achieve 
some elusive concept of government neutrality. The feminist lesson is that in 
order to be meaningful, the guarantee of religious freedom must also be a 
guarantee of inclusion. A Court guided by an emphasis on religious diversity 
can deliver on this guarantee in a way that a Court guided by a focus on 
neutrality canriot. 
Part I of this article sets out the current jurisprudence of the religion 
clauses. It situates and describes the current understanding of government 
neutrality that the Court employs to guide its interpretation. Part II canvasses 
a number of feminist legal insights and then utilizes them to critique the current 
jurisprudence of the religion clauses and to propose · revised guidelines. Part 
8. See discussion i,ifra parts 1, II. 
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III applies the critique and proposed revisions set out in Part II to the Court's 
most recent decision under the religion clauses: Board of Education of Kiryas 
Joel Village School District v. Grumet.9 
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
The First Amendment provides that · "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
•••• "
10 Members of the Supreme Court frequently have noted that the 
purpose of the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, taken 
together, is to guarantee religious freedom. 11 The language of the clauses, 
however, does not delineate the precise nature or scope of the religious 
freedom that both are to protect. 12 Neither the understanding of the clauses' 
d.rafters13 nor specific public understandings 14 nor practices 15 at the time of 
their ratification provide the Court with definitive guidance . The fact that the 
two clauses can appear to issue contradictory commands compounds the 
problem of interpretation . 16 When, for example, public assistance eligibility 
9. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). 
10. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. Although the words of the Constitution refer to "Congress" only, the Court 
has held that both clauses are applicable to the states. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) 
{holding that establishment clause applies to states); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding 
that free exercise clause applies to states). 
11. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112S. Ct. 2649, 2665 (1992) (Blaclcmun, J., concurring) (noting "the 
common purpose of securing religious liberty"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, 
J,, concurring) ("Although a dist.inctjurisprudence has enveloped each of these Clauses, their common 
purpose is to secure religious liberty. On these principles the Court has been and remains unanimous.") 
(citation omitted); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (noting Ma general harmony of 
purpose between the two religious clauses of the First Amendment"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 2'rl (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (nocing that establishment clause and free exercise clause "serv(e) 
the same goal of individual religious freedom"); id. at 305 (Goldberg, J ., concurring) (noting that the two 
religion clauses "are to be read together, and in light of the single end [the promotion of religious liberty] 
which they are designed to serve"); Everson, 330 U.S. at 40 (Rutledge, J. , dissenting) (noting that for 
James Madison, "'establishment' and ' free exercise' were correlative and coextensive ideas, representing 
only different facets of the single great and fundamental freedom"). 
12. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 612 (1971) ("The language of the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment is at best opaque .... "). 
13. See LAVR.ENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTTtrrJONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988) 
(summarizing "at least three distinct schools of thought which influenced the drafters of the Bill of Rights 
... [which are] in some respects complementary, and in others conflicting"). 
14. See Smith, supra note 1, at 157 (contrasting "the pervasively religious world view" that prevailed 
at the time that the religion clauses became a part of the Constitution with the assumptions that underpin 
the Court's understanding of religious freedom). 
15. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD E. ROTUNDA, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1160 (4th ed. 1991) (noting 
that in some states "close ties existed between church and state, with a number of states having established 
churches until well after the time of the revolution"); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 
573, 669-70 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating it is "settled law" that 
"historical practices" have "inform(ed] ... First Amendment jurisprudence," but noting limits on extent 
to which they can inform decisions); id. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Historical acceptance of a 
practice does not in itself validate that practice under the Establishment Clause if the practice violates the 
values protected by that Clause.•); Wal.z v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("[N]o one a~uires 
a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers 
our entire national existence and indeed predates it."). 
16. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) 
("[T]his Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and 
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requirements demand activity that conflicts with an applicant's religious belief, 
does the free exercise clause prohibit enforcing the requirements7t7 Or would 
an exemption from such requirements constitute an establishment of 
religion?" When a religious group s'eeks access to public facilities available 
to nonreligious groups, does the free exercise clause require access or does 
the establishment clause forbid it? 19 These are the types of issues with which 
the Supreme Court has wrestled in its efforts to distill and articulate the 
meaning of the religion clauses. 
Although the Court traditionally has interpreted and analyzed the two 
clauses discretely, 20 one concept has characterized its efforts to define 
religious freedom under both clauses. This concept is government neutrality, 21 
both with respect to particular religions22 and between religion and 
nonreligion. 23 The Court has identified this aspiration of neutrality as the one 
Establishment Clauses."); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 1157 ("There is a natural antagonism 
between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice."); TRIBB, supra 
note 13, § 14-2, at 1157 ("[S)erious tension has often surfaced between the two clauses.") . 
17. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (rejecting Native American parents' claim that because 
assigning their daughter social :security number would damage her spiritual growth, free exercise clause 
required that she be exempted from general requirement that recipients of food stamps and AFDC have 
such numbers). 
18. See, e.g., Philip Kurland, Of Church and Stale and the Supreme Coun , 29 U. cm. L. REv. 1, 
5 (1961) (argui11& that the religion clauses should be interpreted so that "religion may not be used as a basis 
for classification for purposes of government[al] action"). See generally Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the 
Establishme,u Clause: The Ca.se Against Discreticnary Accommodation ef Religion, 140 U. PA. L. Rl!v. 
555 (1991) (same); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and Sta1tand theSupreml! Coun•: Kurland Revisited, 1989 
SUP. er. RBv. 373. 
19. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that establishment clause does not forbid 
public university from giving access to student religious group on same basis as other groups, and holding 
that free speech clause prohibits university from denying group accctss on basis of content of its speech); 
see also Board of Educ. v. Mcrgens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1990) (plurality opinion) (applying W'uimar 
and holding that congressional statute that require.s equal access for religious groups in poblic secondary 
schools does not violate the establishment clause). 
20. Set: Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("IA] distinct 
jurisprudence has enveloped each of these Oauses .•.. "). 
21. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) ("A 
proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a 
course of 'neutrality' toward religion.w); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (noting that a 
regulation "offend[s] the constitutional requirement for govemment neutrality if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of religion"); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372 (1970) (White, J ., dissenting) 
("[N)eutrality, is the goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment."); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 
U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J ., concurring) ("The attitude of government toward religion must, as this 
Court has frequently observed, be one of neutrality."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) 
(Douglas, J. , concurring) ("The First Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to 
religion but of neutrality."). ' 
22. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command ofth.e Establishment 
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over ano~her. "); Zorach v. Qauson, 
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between 
sects."). 
23. See Tex.as Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9·10 (1989) (" It is pan of our settled 
jurisprudence that 'the 8tablishment Clause prohibits aovernment from abandoning secular purposes in 
order to put an imprimatur . .. on religion as such.'") (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 431, 
450 (1971)); Wallace, 472 U.S. al 54 (reaffirming the principle of government neutrality between religion 
and nonreligion despite Justice Rehnquist's assertion in dissent that establishment clause prohibits only 
"preference among religious sects or denominations"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l, 18 (1947) 
("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers 
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that allows government to steer a safe course between the Scylla and Charybdis 
of the two clauses, 24 which prevent government alternately from aiding or 
inhibiting religious belief. 25 Because the Court uses the concept of 
government neutrality as its primary tool for interpreting the meaning of the 
religion clauses, we must examine the Court's concept of neutrality if we are 
to illuminate its understanding of the religious freedom guaranteed by the 
clauses. 
Although the Court has adhered consistently to the verbal formulation of 
government neutrality, its more specific methods of defining the demands of 
the two religion clauses have been undergoing doctrinal change. Until recently, 
the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtunan 26 structured the Court's 
efforts to define government neutrality under the establishment clause. The 
Lemon test stipulated three conditions for government acts that arguably aid 
religion. First , the acts must have a secular purpose. Second, they must have 
a principal or primary effect that does not advance or inhibit religion. Third, 
they must not give rise to excessive government entanglement with religion.27 
The Court has been moving away from the Lemon test, although it has not yet 
formally overruled it. 28 Criticisms of the Lemon standard have focused on 
its variability and indeterminacy. 29 In the move away from Lemon, the Court 
has attempted to pick and choose among its precedents to reach a clearer and 
more consistent definition of government neutrality toward religion. 
and non-believen .•.. "); su also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom aJ a Crossroads, 59 U. 
CH1. L. Rev. 115, 14546 (1992) (noting that Justice Rehnquist has argued for nonpreferentialist 
interpretation, but probably will rely less on it in future because of historical research demonstrating that 
position is inconsistent with original intent) (citing Douglas Laycock, The Origins of the Religion Clauses 
of the Con.stitwion: "N011preferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 21 WM. & 
MARY L. Rev. 875 (1986)). 
24. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (lamenting that 
the Court had broadly construed both clauses, thereby unnecessarily narrowing "the channel between [the 
two obstacles] through which any state or federal action must pass in order to survive constitutional 
scrutiny"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struuled to find a neutral 
course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, 
if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."). 
25. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) ("[O]ur 
cases require the State to maintain an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 'inhibiting' reli&ion. "). 
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
27. Id. at 612-13. 
28. Compart Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (not relying explicitly on Lemon) 
and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. a. 2462 (1993) (same) and Lee v. Weisman, 112 
S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (same) with Lamb's Oiapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 
2148 n.7 (1993) ("(T]here is a proper way to inter an established decision and Lemon ... has not been 
overruled.") and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2663 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Since 1971, the 
Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one insta.nce, [Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783 (1983)), has the Court not rested its decision on the basic principles described in Lemon."). 
29. See, e.g., Gruma, 114 S. a. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Any test that must deal with 
widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to be useless."); Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissentin&) ("The 
problem with (and the allure of) Lemon has not been that it is 'riaid, • but rather that in many applications 
it has been utterly meaningless, validating whatever result the Court would desire." ); Wallace, 472 U.S. 
at 112 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) (the Lemen test has pro<hlced only "consistent unpredictability"). See 
gtnerally Carl H. Esbeck, The Ltmon Tesr: Should It Be Retained, RifonnulaJtd. or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 513, 543 (1990) ("It is hard to think of a contemporary legal doctrine 
that is as besieged from all quarters as is the Lemo·n test."). 
142 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 7: 137 
Until recently, the Court purported to apply a balancing test to free 
exercise clause questions, weighing the government's interest in uniform 
application of a given requirement against the burden that the requirement 
imposes on the complaining religious practitioner. 30 In 1990, the Court 
explicitly refined its doctrine to eliminate the compelling interest balancing test 
in favor of a simpler and more determinate judicial formula. 31 
The Court's efforts to clarify and harmonize previous precedents yield its 
understa nding of government neutralit y. This understanding in turn undergirds 
the Court's definition of the religious freedom which is the goal of the two 
clauses. Most crucially, government neutrality for the Court means the absence 
of a purpose to aid or restrict religious practices "because of their religious 
motivation. "32 In contrast to such a purpose, however, an advantageous or 
disadvantageous effect on such practices does not for the Court call into 
question the neutrality of the government's ·action. If the effects on religious 
practice are not the intentional products of government decisionmaking, then 
they are necessarily "incidental" or "attenuated. "33 This characterization of 
30. A number of th~ cases applied a test requiring a "compelling" state interest to justify imposing 
a burden on religious practice. In these cases, the Court found the free exercise clause required an 
exemption for the claimants from aenerally applicable legal requirements that burdened their religious 
practice. See Hobbie v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (claim for 
unemployment benefits); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("Where fundame.ntal claims of religious freedom are at stake ... we must 
searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement ... and the impediment 
to those objectives that would flow from recoanizine the claimed ... exception."); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying a compelling interest balancin& test to a religious practitioner's claim for 
unemployment benefits based on her termination because the work schedule conflicted with her religious 
beliefs); see also Hernandezv. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (finding government's interest 
in uniform application of the tax laws to be compelling); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (same); 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (applying compellina interest test to military draft 
requirement and upholding requirement). 
Other cases applied a more lenient standard, still phrased in terms of a balancing test, and rejected 
the free exercise claim. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707--08 (1986) (nondiscriminatory 
government benefit requirements need only be "reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public 
interest"); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (accommodatina Amish objection to compulsory 
participation in social security system would "unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental 
interest"); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 462 (incidental burdens of military draft on conscientious objectors are 
"strictly justified by substantial governmental interests"); see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 
507 (1986) ("[W]hen evaluatin& whether military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously 
motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities 
concernina the relative importance of a particular military interest."). 
31. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) ("generally applicable, relieion-
neutral laws" need not be justified under a compelling interest standard or balancing test); see also id. at 
878-79 ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.~). 
32. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2227 (1993). 
33. See. e.g., Gnunet, 114 S. Ct. at 2489 (where the government delegates civic authority to religious 
bodies, constitutionality may be located "in the distinction between a government's purposeful delegation 
on the basis of religion and a deteaation on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose religious 
identities are incidental to their receipt of civic authority"); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 
S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) ("[W]e have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide 
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an 
Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial 
benefit.~); Smirh, 494 U.S. at 878 c·[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of [a 
government action] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, 
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the government action's purpose, rather than a consideration of the magnitude 
of its effect, determines whether the action is constitutional. 34 
For example, under the establishment clause the neutrality, and hence the 
constitutionality, of government financial aid to parochial school activities 
depends upon the method by which public funds arrive at the religious 
institutions, not their amount. The Court has characterized direct benefits as 
non-neutral because such benefits constitute aid that moves without an 
intermediary from the government to religious organizations. 35 Although 
attenuated benefits, like direct benefits, "ultimately flow[ ] to religious 
institutions," they do so "only as a result of the genuinely independent and 
private choices of a·id recipients. "36 The religious institutions are therefore 
"only incidental beqeficiaries. "37 The decision to advance religion is thereby 
a private one and not fairly attributable to government decisionmaking. 38 
A related factor in establishment clause neutrality is whether instances of 
government aid "provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without 
reference to religion. "39 The breadth of the class benefitted has been a crucial 
factor in the determination of the constitutionality of a number of school aid 
programs, 40 as well as other government programs that provide aid to 
religious organizations. 41 By contrast, some government aid programs have 
been struck down as unconstitutional because their classifications were limited 
to religious beneficiaries. 42 
the First Amendment bas not been offended."). 
34. Su Zcbrest, 113 S. Ct at 2~7 (noting that Court had previously upheld a MiMeSota law 
allowing taxpayers to deduct certain eduational expenses "even though the vast majority of those 
deo.Ictions (perhapS over 90%) wem to parents whose children attended sectarian schools") (citing Mueller 
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)); Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (listing cases where the Court denied a free 
exercise clause claim despite the effects of the state action on reliaious practice); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 
401 (stating that Court was "loathe to adopt a rule groundina the constitutionality of a facially neutral law" 
on quantitative recitations of impact of law). 
35. Su Zcbrest, 113 S. Ct at 2468 (distinguishing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and 
School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), as involvin& direct grants of eovemment aid). 
36. z.obrest, 113 S. Ct at 2467 (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 487 (1986)). 
37. Id. at 2469. 
38. Id. at 2467 ("[B]ecause the rDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian 
school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state decision making."). 
39. Id. at 2466. 
40. See id.; see also Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (noting, in upholdin& Washington's extension of 
vocational rehabilitation assistmce to student at Christian college, that Washington's assistance program 
was "'made available generally without regard 10 the sectarian-nonsectarian . .. nature of the institution 
benefited'") (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reliaious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.38 
(1973)); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 {1983) (upholding law that permits parents to deduct their 
children's educational expenses for public school or private schools). 
41. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. !189 (1988) (holding that Adolescent Fainily Life Act 
may designate religious organizations as providers of counseling because the organizations are listed as 
pan of general group of other providers); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property 
tax exemptions for religious organizations in part because many other nonreligious organizations receive 
them); see also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 & n.7 (distmauishina Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), 
and Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, on grounds that the aid in those cases singled out a class of citizens for special 
economic benefit). 
42. See, e.g., Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2481 (striking down a New York statute creating special school 
district for town with boundaries drawn to include only property owned and inhabited by practitioners of 
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While the requirement that the government treat religious entities and 
practitioners exactly the same as oilier groups and individuals is important in 
establishment clause jurisprudence: it ·CO!llpletely defines the government's 
obligations under the free exercise clause. 43 A "generally applicable, religion-
neutral l~w[ ] " cannot unconstitutionally burden a religious practice. 44 Thus 
a state may criminalize the use of peyote and deny unemployment benefits to 
individuals discharged from their jobs for using peyote as part of a Native 
American religious ceremony. This reasoning has held despite the fact that for 
some Native Americans peyote use defines "the essential ritual of their 
religion" and the impact on religious practice of criminalizing it is "potentially 
devastating. "45 Similarly, the federal government may require Native 
Americans to obtain a social security number for their children in order to 
receiv e government benefits despite the claim that such an act would murder 
the children's souls. 46 The government also may prohibit a military officer 
from wearing a yarmulke indoors, 47 desecrate federal lands sacred to Native 
Americans, 48 and refuse to excuse prison inmates from work requirements to 
attend religious services. 49 These incidental effects of neutral government 
actions survive constitutional scrutiny because they do not represent attempts 
to regulate or prohibit conduct because it is undertaken for religious 
reasons. 50 
Under the free e~rcise clause government actions that single out religious 
entities or practitioners for disadvantageous treatment "must undergo the most 
rigorous of scrutiny. "51 Under the establishment clause, however, government 
treads close to a violation when it grants specific beneficial treatment to a 
religious entity or practitioner. The Court's analysis is more lenient in this 
area. In two types of situations the Court has interpreted the religion clauses 
to permit a link between government benefits and religious practice or belief. 
One such instance is where the government acts to lift a preexisting burden 
on religious practice. Although the Court has reasoned that the free exercise 
clause does not requite government to grant religious entities or . practitioners 
strict form of Judaism); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down state statute 
that exempted only religious publications from certain tax). · 
43. Congress claimed that it "restoreld) the compelling interest test" in cases in which individuals seek 
exemption from a generally applicable rule that substantially burdens religious practice. Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West i994). The Act's constitutionality on this front under 
the establishment clause is uncertain. See Ira C. Lupu, Srarures Revolving in COIIJtirutional I.Aw Orbits, 
79 VA. L. REV. l (1993). 
44. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990). 
45. Id. at 921 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
46. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
47. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
48. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
49. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
50. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2233 (1993) (noting 
that laws which target religious conduct for distinctive treatment, or which adva.nce governmental interest 
against only religiously motivated conduct, survive strict scrutiny Kenly in rare cases"). 
51. Id. at 2233. 
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exemptions from generally applicable laws, 52 it has interpreted the 
establishment clause to permit such exemptions obtained through the political 
process." Where the government explicitly benefits religious groups and 
practitioners in lawmaking, the Court's inquiry will center on whether the 
result is to lift a preexisting burden on religious practi ce. 54 
Even when it can identify no preexisting burden, the Court has been 
reluctant to adopt an understanding of government neutrality that prohibits any 
government recognition of religion. The second instance in which the Court 
may find that an explicit link between government and religion survives 
establishment clause scrutiny is when the government aid to religion is in the 
form of symbolic recognition . In a line of cases involving such 
symbolic-rather than financial-advantages, the Court has struggled to define 
government neutrality to allow some, but not all, government use of 
traditionally religious symbols or practices. 55 
The constitutionality of seasonal displays that contain religious imagery 
probably constitutes the most confused area of the Court' s juri spruden ce. 56 
In one holiday display case, the Court found the public display of a city-owned 
creche in a private park to be constitutional. 57 In the only other such case, 
the Court held that the display of a privately-owned creche on public property 
violated the Constitution. 58 The explanation the Court offers for the different 
results in these two cases is that in one instance the creche was surrounded by 
other, more secular holiday symbols such as Santa Claus, plastic reindeer and 
a talking wishing well.59 In the other, the creche "stood alone" except for 
a background of poinsettias which, instead of secularizing the display, only 
highlighted its religious aspects.60 In addition, while invalidating the latte r 
holiday creche display, the Court upheld the same county's display ,of a 
menorah. 61 According to the Court, a Christmas tree and a seasonal greeting 
52. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is 
permitted ... is not to say that it is constitutionally required. A). 
53. Id. ("Values that are protected from government interference through enshrinement in the Bill 
of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process."). 
54. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (determining that the creation of a special school district around 
the boundaries of a Saunar Hasidic Village was not a permissible accommodation of a burden). 
55. Where such activity occurs in public schools, the Court has consistently prohibited it. See Lee 
v. Weisman, 112 S. Cl. 2649 (1992) (graduation prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (postina 
of the Ten Commandments); Enael v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer). In other public arenas, 
however, the Court has been more ambivalent. See County of Alleaheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 
(holding County's cr~he display is unconstitutional, while display including a menorah is constitutional); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (creche display in public park is constitutional); Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (legislative prayer is constitutional). 
56. See Smith, supra note 1, at 226 (noting that inconsistent doctrines arise not only between different 
cases, but also wiLhin sinale decisions, such as Allegheny). 
51. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
58. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573. 
59. Id. at 598. Practitioners have referred to this as the "plastic reindeer rule." See McConnell, 
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115 (1992); Jeffrey Rosen, Lemen Law, nm NEW 
REPUBLIC, Mar. 29, 1993, at 17, 17. 
60. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 599. 
61. Id. at 620-21. 
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sign that also appeared in the menorah display secularized the display, thereby 
rendering it constitutional. 62 
The Court has not decided upon a test to apply when government explicitly 
advantages religion through symbolic recognition. 63 Justices have proposed 
that either government endorsement64 or coercion65 of religious belief should 
be the mark of constitutional invalidity. Despite differences in formulation and 
focus,66 the two approaches are similar in that they both look to the 
reasonable perceptions of a nonadherent as the benchmark for constitutional 
invalidity.67 Because of this focus on perceptions, neither test affords 
predictability of application in specific circumstances. 68 
In sum, the Court has defined a concept of neutrality that animates its 
religion clauses jurisprudence. Although perhaps not completely consistent, 
the particulars of the Court's conception are fairly clear. The crux of the 
62. Id. at 614. 
63. The O>wt appeared to embrace the endorsement test in Allegheny. Id. at S93. But in Lee v. 
Weisman the Court applied a coercion test, without deciding whether endorsement would also be a mark 
of constitutional invalidity. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992). Since those decisions were reached, theO>urt's 
membership has changed; it is unclear where the majority of today's Court stands. 
64. Alleghelf)', 492 U.S. at 593; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'O>MOr, J., 
concurring) ("Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid 
... because it 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an aixompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community.·-) (citations omitted). 
6S. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 ("The Constitution guarantees that government may not 
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
'establishes a [state) religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 678 (1984)); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J. , concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(same) . 
66. An important difference between the endorsement and coercion tests is that the endorsement test 
invalidates a slightly wider range of government activity. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2673·76 
(Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting notion that "state coercion of religious conformity, over and above state 
endorsement of religious ci1ercise or belief, is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation"). 
In particular, the endorsement test recognizes a stigmatic component to majoritarian religious practices that 
can be independent of actual government pressure to conform to a particular religious belief. See 
McO>nnell, supro note 23, at 164-65. Thus, the endorsement test balances the interests of majority and 
minocity adherents in a different way than a test which focuses solely on coercion. Despite the desire of 
a religious majority to celebrate its commonality, the endorsement test requires it to give way where its 
celebration effectively excludes nonmembers from political participation. 
67. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658 (finding "reasonable perception" of coercion); Lynch, 
465 U.S. at 693 (O'O>nnor, J ., concurring) (finding that cr~he display "cannot fairly be understood to 
convey a mes.sage of government endorsement of religion"). 
68. In the most recent holiday display case before the O>urt, the Justices agreed on the use of the 
endorsement test, but reached numerous different conclusions as to the religious or secular nature of the 
symbols employed and as to whether, in light of these natures, the displays unconstitutionally endorsed 
religious belief. See Alleghelf)', 492 U.S. S73 (holding crbchc display unconstitutional while holding 
menorah display constitutional); id. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (employing different perception analysis as to the menorah display); id. at 637 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that both displays are unconstitutional). Similarly, 
coercion depends upon whether the government "give[s) direct benefits to religion in such a degree that 
it in fact 'establishes a [state] relig"ion or religious faith, or tench to do so.•• Id. at 6S9 (Kennedy, J. , 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). Since some goverrunent use 
of reli&fous symbols could have this effect, id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), the coercion test also depends upon perception and degree, and toos is highly variable); id. at fJJI 
(plurality opinion) (pointing out indeterminacy of the coercion test); id. at 629 (O'O>nnor, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (same). 
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Court's understanding is that government actions that affect religious entities 
or practitioners, either positively or negatively, but which are only a part of 
an overall system of activity not specifically directed at religion, meet the 
constitutional requirement of neutrality regardless of the magnitude of the 
impact. Where, instead, government action singles religiou s entities or 
practitioners out for disadvantageous treatment, the Court has held that such 
an action violates the constitutional guarantee of government neutrality, unless 
it is justified by a compelling state interest. Where a government action 
specifically targets religious entities or practitioners for advantageous 
treatment, the Court's understanding of the demands of neutrality becomes 
more complex. Government actions that lift a burden that otherwise applicable 
governmental rules would impose on a religious entity or practitioner are 
constitutionally pe.rmissible, although not constitutionally required. Finally, 
even if it does not lift a burden , such advantageous treatment is allowable if 
it acknowledges particular religious traditions without coercing the participation 
of those outside the tradition or, under the endorsement test, stigmatizing them 
as being somehow outside the political community. 
That these emerging interpretations can be identified indicates that the 
Court is honing and refining its understanding of the neutrality that the religion 
clauses require. Although clarity is certainly welcome, a successful 
interpretation of the religion clauses by the Court will also depend on the 
substance of the resulting understandings . Feminist legal insights provide a 
crucial tool for evaluating the Court's substantive efforts. 
Il. FEMINIST LEGAL INSIGHTS AND THE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
Feminist legal theory was developed by women as a critique of a le.gal 
structure that systematically subordinated women. 69 Its initial focus was upon 
areas of the law which affect women differently than men; these areas remain 
its primary concern. 70 But as feminist legal theory has grown, its applicability 
has expanded as well. 
The crux of the feminist commitment is liberty, equality and justice for 
all.71 In defining this commitment, feminists have had to face the question 
of what those broad concepts mean in light of conflicting particular 
interpretations, and the challenge of how practically to achieve the chosen 
meanings. Despite the lack of a consensus on the exact interpretation of these 
69. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer OIi Feminist Thecry and Torr, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3, 4 (1988) 
("Whatever the focus of our particular work, all feminist efforts are combined in struegle to eradicate 
women's subordinate status."). 
70. Ste Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Melhods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 847 (1990) 
(discussing importance of asking "the woman question· in law). 
71. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. L.J. 1493, 1497 ("For 
me, the feminist project is ultimately a humanist project involving the pursuit of equality, justice, safety, 
respect, compassion and well being for all.•). , 
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concepts, women's common ~xperience of subordination has yielded important 
insights into what equality, liberty and justice must mean, and thus feminist 
legal theory is relevant to any question that requires interpretation and 
application of these ideals . 
The appropriate modern meaning of the religion clauses presents just such 
a question . In fact, the genesis of the religion clauses and their jurisprudence 
parallels the birth and growth of feminist legal theory. The religion clauses are 
an explicit constitutional embodiment of a commitment to a particular type of 
freedom. The commitment grew out of circumstances that have now changed 
in their concrete parti culars. The guarantee, however, remains , and the task 
of the Court is to decipher the meaning of that commitment in light of possible 
conflicting and overlapping interpretations. 
Although not specifically embodied in a constitutional provision,72 feminist 
legal theory originated with a commitment to gender freedom that was highly 
dependent on its historical context.73 The meaning of the feminist commitment 
to gender freedom has had to evolve in response to historical changes and 
recognitions that have made the meanings of both of the component 
terms-gender and freedom-in creasingly complex. Feminist legal efforts can 
now appropriately inform the juri sprudence of the religion clauses. A brief 
review of some of the relevant feminist legal insights will pave the way toward 
applying them to the jurisprud ence of the religion clauses. 74 
A. A Brief Description of Feminist Legal Insights 
One feminist legal effort has been to expose the harm that the use of broad 
legal concepts can impose upon politically and socially subordinated groups 
if such concepts are not specifically defined and ju stified. In particular, 
72. Women have used the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve aspects 
of gender freedom. See, e.g., J .E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (invalidating 
prosecutor's ex:ercise of peremptory challenges on basis of gender); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) 
(establishing intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifications); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) 
(invalidating statutory preference for male estate administrators). This constitutional provision, however, 
does not specifically address gender and certainly does not fonn the boundaries of feminist lep.l theory. 
73. See generally HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE {Elizabeth Cady Stanton eta!. eds., Ayer Co. 198S) 
(1881-1922) (documentary history of struggle for women's suffrage). 
74. The ifOWing body of feminist theory both informs and is informed by other schools of legal and 
political theory. See, e.g., Donna Greschner. Feminist Ccncems with the New Ccmmunitarlans: We Don't 
Need AllQthe.r Hero, in LAW AND THE COMMUNITY 119 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Leslie J.M. Green eds., 
1989) (feminism and communitarianism); Linda Hirshman, '/he Book of A, 78 TEX. L. RBV. 971 (1992) 
(discussing contribution of Aristotelian theory to questions of feminist theory); Margaret J. Radin, '/he 
Feminist and the Pragmatist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699 (1990) (illustrating usefulness of combining feminist 
and pragmatist approaches); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 Sr AN. L. REV. 617 (1990) 
(discussing relationship between critical legal theory and feminist theory); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virrue 
and the Feminist Voice in Constitutional Adjudic!Jlion, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986) {feminism and civic 
republicanism); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurispl"lldence and Free Speech Theory, 68 TuL. L. REV, 
1563, 1S71-72 (1994) {providing detailed ex.planation and justification of how and why the epistemologiQI 
insights that she applies to free speech theory are feminist). 
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feminists,75 like critical theorists, 76 have exposed the deceptive nature of the 
concept of neutrality. Neutrality must always be defined by reference to a 
preexisting set of conditions. These conditions are not themselves neutral in 
the sense of equally addressing the interests and needs of all, but are 
historically specific and have often been generated by the more powerful social 
and political forces to respond to their interests.77 Nevertheless, the language 
of neutrality can create an undeserved aura of authority for a legal 
judgment. 78 
Another legal concept in need of specific definition is that of equality. The 
Constitution (as interpreted by the Supr eme Court) 79 and various statutes 80 
contain guara ntees of equal treatment of men and women. In addition to such 
explicit guarantees, equality is often a legislative policy goal. By and large , 
courts and policymakers have interpreted the ideal of equality to requir e that 
the government treat men and women the same . 81 Thu s, under both the 
Constitution82 and many statutes, 83 a showing of different treatm ent 
75. Su, e.g., Leslie Bender, Prom Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan 
and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. I , 19 (1990) (discussing importance of recognizing gender 
biases in ostensibly neutral theory); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma 
(/the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTIU! DAME L. REv. 886, 893 (1989) ("Universal and 
objective thinking is male language because intellectually, economically, and politically privileged men 
have had the power to ignore other perspectives and thus to come to think of their situation as the norm, 
their reality as reality, and their views as objective."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Coun 1986 
Term-Fore'NOrd: Jusrice Engendered, IOI HARV. L. REV. 10, 38-45 (1987) (discussing harm of "unstated 
norm" in equal treatment jurisprudence). 
76. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, The Player and rhe Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 
1, 40-47 (1984) (critiquing concept of neutrality). 
77. As Catharine MacKinnon has written: 
[T]he state is male in that objectivity is its norm. Objectivity is liberal legalism's conception of 
itself. It le&itimizes itself by reflecting its view of existing society, a society it made and makes 
by so seeing it, and calling that view, and that relation, practical rationality .... [The rule of 
objectivity] ensures that the Jaw will most reinforce existing distributions of power when it most 
closely adheres to its own highest ideal of fairness. 
Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,. Method, and the Stme: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 
635, 642 (1983). 
78. Bartlett, supra note 70, at 862 & n.134 ("Feminists have found that neutral rules and procedures 
tend to drive underground the ideologies of the decision maker, and that these ideologies do not serve 
'M)men's interests well."); MARTHA MlNOW, MAKINO ALL THE DIFFERENCE: (NCLUS10N, ExCLUSION, 
AND AMERICAN LAW 34-3S (1990) ("(U]nfairness will result under the guise of objectivity .... 
[D]ifference assigned by someone with power over a more vulnerable person will become endowed with 
an apparent reality.•). 
79. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV; Reed v. Recd, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (applying equal protection 
clause to invalidate a gender classification). 
80. E.g., Title Vil of the Civil Rigltts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20003 (1982). 
81. See, e.g., Reed, 404·U.S. at 76 ("'(Alli persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" ) 
(quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). Within feminist legal theory, this 
type of argument is called "equality as sameness." See, e.g., Menlcel-Meadow, supra note 71, at 1497-1502 
(describing evolution of sameness-difference debate within feminist legal theory). 
82. See, e.g., Reed, 404 U.S. at 75 ("[The statute] provides that different treatment be accorded to 
the applicants on the basis of their sex: it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause."). 
83. Ste, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 33S n.15 (1977) (Under 
Title VII, "'(d]isparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer 
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their ... sex .... "). A plaintiff can also 
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination by showing that an employment policy ha.s a 
disparate impact on women. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (reinstituting the disparate 
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establishes a prima facie showing of a violation. These constitutional and 
statutory guarantees, and their judicial interpretations, have helped to ensure 
that women receive the same treatment that men do.84 This concept of 
equality has exposed ideological assumptions about differences between men 
and women which have often proved to be untrue, thereby helping to break 
down stereotyped expectations about women's interests, capabilities, and 
proper roles in the world. 85 
Treating women exactly the same as men in the formal sense, however, 
does not guarantee equal social, political, and economic standing. Because the 
class of men, by and large, have created the standards of legal treatment, these 
standards often correspond more directly to the interests and needs of men, 
rather than those of women. 86 Truly equal treatment requires revising the 
standard of treatment so that it meets equally the interests and needs of both 
classes of people, rather than simply treating women according to the 
preexisting standard. 87 
The paradigmatic example of a need for such standard revision in order 
to reach gender equality involves the treatment of pregnancy leave in the 
workplace. In a sense, a benefits package which does not cover absences from 
work due to pregnancy treats men and women equally in that members of both 
sexes receive exactly the same benefit package: one that excludes childbirth-
related leave and benefits. as But the effect of this formal definition of equality 
impact standard established in G~ggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). 
84. For decisions finding this guaranlee in the Fourteenth Amendment, see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U.S. 7 (1975) (equal right to parental support); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (equal right 
to claim spouses as dependents for receipt of mi.litary benefits); and Reed, 404 U.S. at 71 (equal right to 
be estate administrators). For a decision finding this guaranree in Title vn, see, for ex.ample, International 
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (holdin& women have equal right to 
employment which requires contact with hazardous substances). 
85. Compare Hoyt v. Flori<ta, 368 U.S. S1, 62 (l96l)(justifying different rules for jury service on 
grounds that "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life") and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 
U.S. 464 (1948) (affirming constitutionality of statute prohibiting women from serving liquor) wi1h Orr 
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979) ("[T)he 'old notio[n]' that 'generally it is the man's primary 
responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,• can no longer justify a stalllte that discriminates on 
the basis of gender.") (alteration in original) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975)). 
86. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 70, at 880 (noting "women's position of exclusion"); Clare.Dalton, 
Where We Stand: Observations on 1he Si1uati0fl of Feminisr Legal 'lhdughr, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 
l, 6 (1987) ("Women have long, if not always, held the suspicion, if not the knowledge, that what passed 
for point-of-view-less-ness was in fact His point of view. A point of view which did not always correspond 
to hers."); Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Evuy1hlng: The lll(Juiries of Feminisl JurlspnJdence, 1 
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 64, 68 (1986) (arguing that "women are le~ out" of "the categories used by 
traditionally male modes of scholarship"). 
87. Within feminist theory this view of equality is called "equality as difference" or substantive 
equality. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton, Equaliryand Feminist Legal Theary, 48 U. Pm. L. REv. 1043, 
lOSO (1987) ("[T)here is no logical, inherent link between difference and /llequality. "); see a.l.w MINOW, 
supra note 78, at 20 {"The problem of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating members of minority 
groups the same as members of the majority and by treating the two groups differently."). 
88. See General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976) (holding that employer's disability-
benefits plan which failed to cover pregnancy-related disabilities did not violate Title VII); Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (holding that califomia statute that excluded such benefits was not 
invidious discrimination under equal protection clause); see also Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: 
Some Reflec1ions on Cu/Jure, Couns and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175, 191-97 (1982) 
(discussing Gilbert and Geduldig and arguing that pregnancy should not be treated as a "special casew). 
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is that women will lose money and/or their jobs when they have children, 
whereas men will not. The price of equality with respect to one variable is 
inequality with respect to another. 
There may thus exist a tension between two definitions of equality: formal 
equality and substantive equality. Formal equality means equal treatment, while 
substantive equality may mean different treatment that achieves an equal result. 
So, for example, a state decision to provide women with guaranteed job leave 
for childbirth may be consistent with the federal statutory . guarantee of 
equality, even though the treatment that men and women receive under the 
state statute is different. 89 The difference in benefits in fact achieves a certain 
type of equality, which is that both men and women can have babies and keep 
their jobs. . 
The differences between these two definitions of equality may force a 
choice. Whichever definition is ultimately chosen will require justification. In 
many instances, the benefits of formally equal treatment may justify resulting 
substantive inequality. This precept was central to much early feminist 
litigation, which was designed to undermine the idea that men and women are 
essentially different. Yet in some instances the benefits of formally equal 
treatment will not outweigh the unequal effect. Increasing numbers of feminists 
are making the argument that attention must be paid to the actual social and 
political circumstances of the people affected by any government action. Only 
once this is done, some feminists argue, will courts be able to determine 
whether women as a class will be disproportionately adversely impacted by 
ostensibly equal government treatment. 
Despite these arguments, however, the fact that formally equal treatment 
needs to be justified as the best vision of equality is often lost in legal 
interpretations and policy discussions. Support for this proposition can be 
found in the discourse surrounding arguments in favor 9f achieving substantive 
equality through different treatment. These arguments, such as the one that 
· childbearing leave for women is a necessary component of workplace equality, 
are often characterized as requests for "special" treatment. 90 From the point 
of view of most women, however, physically bearing children is a normal part 
of life, and it is the workplace standard that addresses only a special class of 
workers-those who do not biologically bear children. 91 Thus the rhetoric of 
89. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) ("California's pregnancy 
disability-leave statute allows women, as well as men, to have families without losing their jobs."). 
90. See, e.g., Guerra, 479 U.S. at300 (White, J., dissenting) ("'[The Pregnancy Discrimination Act) 
in no way provides special disability benefits for working women.'") (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 29,664 
(19n) (statement of Sen. Brooke)). 
91. As Christine Littleton has written: 
Given the way employment is struetured, preanancy renders a woman unable to work for a few 
days to a few months, just like illness and injury do for men. However, what makes pregnancy 
a disability rather than, say, an additional ability, is the structure of work, not reproduction. 
Normal pregnancy may make a woman unable to 'work' for days, weeks or months, but it also 
makes her able to reproduce. From whose viewpoint is the work that she camot do 'work,' and 
the work that she is doing fl()f >M>rk'! Certainly not from hers. 
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"special" treatment stigmatizes those who argue for it or receive it as asserting 
entitlement to something outside what is "normal," and makes change directed 
at redefining established norms more difficult to achieve.92 A primary 
feminist effort is therefore to expose such .legal definitions as contingent and 
disputed. 
Liberty is another broad legal concept that feminist legal thought has found 
dangerous without a precise and justified definition. In the case of liberty, the 
presumed definition is negative. That is, the government preserves individual 
liberty by not acting against individuals. This assumption underlies the 
constitutional requirement that affirmative state action is required to establish 
a vi~lation of individual rights guarantees . 93 It also · forms the basis for 
whatever lines the government, as a matter of policy, chooses to draw between 
a public, regulated sphere and a private sphere that should be free of 
government regulation. 94 
To be sure, freedom from some forms of government regulation has always 
been important to women as well as men.95 But in other areas, freedom from 
government intervention has meant different things for the individual liberties 
of women than for those of men. One example is the traditional exemption of 
the "private" arena of activities that occur within the home from the "public" 
sphere of government regulation. 96 While the intended effect of this division 
might be to promote the individual liberty of both women and men by leaving 
them free from intrusive government rules, the actual effect might be to deny 
women liberty. 97 The absence of government regulation means that unjust 
Christine A. Littrelon, Reconstrw:ting Sexual Equaliry, 15 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1306 (1987) (footnote 
omitted). Moreover, women's and men's experierM;CS after childbirth are likely to differ because of the 
different social expectatio!U placed upon women and men with respect to childcare. The workplace, for 
example, by and large assumes workers without childcare responsibilities to be the norm. See Joan C. 
Williams,Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 836 ( 1989) ("Feminists' goal must be to redesi&n 
wage labor to take account of reproduction."); Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 108-09 (noting agreement among feminists "on a central reality: The workplace 
is structured to respond to the life patterns of male workers and inadequately accommodates workers who 
become pregnant, give birth and carry major parental responsibilities"). 
92. See CATHARJNB A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 38 (1987) ("If we're going to be 
stigmati1.ed as different, it would be nice if the compensation would fit the disparity."). 
93. Su, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (interpreting earlier 
Civil Rights Cases to establish "the essential dichotomy .•• between deprivation by the State, subject to 
scrutiny under (the Fourteenth Amendment,) and private conduct . . . against which the Fourteenth 
Amendment offers no shield"). 
94. See Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminise Critiq~s of dte Public/Pri~me Disrinaion, 10 
CoNST. CoMMENT. 319 (1993) (elucidating and critiquing public/private distinction); Ruth Gavison, 
Feminism and the Publlc/PriWJte D/stincrion, 45 SrAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that public/private 
distinction should be altered but not abolished). 
95. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 94, at 36-37 ("!Do) women have no interest in the values of privacy 
and intimacy, or (arc) there . •• no contexts in which women would want to keep the state out of their 
lives? Presumably ... the answer is no."). 
96. See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of Seate lntervension in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. 
RBF. 835 (1985) (arguing that the ideal of "nonintervention" is incoherent and detrimental to women and 
children). 
97. See Gavison, supra note 94, at 36 ("Women should ... recognize that invocations of the value 
of privacy arc a means of perpetuating their oppression by creating the false impression that protection of 
privacy is good for women, by isolating them, and by depoliticizing their struggle."). 
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private power relationships endure,91 and women are disproportionately the 
less powerful marital partner physically, politically, and economically. For 
example, nonregulation of the private sphere may decrease the liberty of 
v.omen by leaving them vulnerable to domestic abuse. 99 In such a situation, 
government regulation might enhance rather than inhibit the individual liberty 
of women.100 
Similarly, one feminist view holds that the negative ideal of liberty 
embodied in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the free speech clause of 
the First Amendment protects the liberty of men while actually subverting the 
liberty of women. 101 For example, some proponents of this view argue that 
a constitutional doctrine that prohibits government regulation of .pornogra-
phy102 allows predominantly male speakers to define the public and private 
image of women. These images, which portray women as subordinate to men, 
reproduce subordinating treatment of women. Turning the free speech 
argument on its head, spokeswomen for this view argue that pornographic 
"speech" silences the v.omen it depicts, by defining them as less v.orthy and 
less capable of speaking. 100 
Other feminists, while acknowledging the dangerous effects of 
pornography, nonetheless argue against its regulation. Although they are 
equally concerned with women's liberty, they see state censorship of sexually 
oriented speech as the greater threat to women's liberty. 104 Despite the 
difference in their substantive prescriptions, these conflicting views lead to the 
same conclusion that has emerged from competing feminist definitions of 
equality-that no definition is self-evident. Any definition of "liberty" requires 
justification in light of the various liberties that it will promote or hinder . 
Underlying the feminist discussions of equality and liberty is a recognition 
that these concepts are necessarily interrelated. In particular, some degree of 
equality among individual.s is a necessary prerequisite for each individual to 
possess liberty. Absent some degree of equality among individuals, liberty 
guarantees mean that the more powerful individuals have the freedom to 
98. See Olsen, supra note 94, at 326 ("[T]he standard situation in which one enjoys privacy and 
freedom is not a situation of equality but one of hierarchy."). 
99. See. e.g., Margaret Martin, Batrered Women, in THE VIOLENT FAMILY: VICTIMIZATION OF 
WOMEN, Clin.DREN, AND ELDERS 65, 82 (Nancy Hutchings ed., 1988). 
100. See Deborah L. Rhode, Femi11/stCritical1heories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617,6 31 (1990) (~Contrary 
to liberal legal assumptions, the state's refusal to intervene in private matters has not necessarily expanded 
individual autonomy; it has often simply substituted private for public power."). 
101. See, e.g., Robin West, Reconstructing Uberty, 59 TENN. L. RBV. 441, 443 (1992) ("[T]he 
modem conception of ordered liberty is a largely empty promise for women.") . 
102. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (71h Cir. 198S) (finding Indianapolis 
anti-pornography ordinance drafted by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin inconsistent with free 
speech guarantee of First Amendment), ajf'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
103. See. e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as De/QllliJtion and Discrimination, 71 B.U. 
L. REV. 793 (1991). 
104. See Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae o/FeminlstAnl/-Censorship Taskforce, 
et al., In AmeriCQII Booksellers AssoclaJion v. Hudnut, 21 u. MICH. J.L. REF. 69 (1987-1988); Mary C. 
Dunlap, Suual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography /11 its Place, 17 GoLDBN GATE u. L. REV. 
359 (1987). 
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impose their wills upon the less powerful and hence liberty for the less 
powerful is illusory. 105 On the other hand, any state-imposed requirement 
of equality among individuals diminishes some individual s' liberties. The trick, 
of course, is to determine the right mix of state-imposed equality and state-
guaranteed liberty . 
Despite their common goal of gender freedom, there is no consensus 
among feminists as to what this balance between government action and 
inaction should be. 106 Feminists do agree that the law disproportionately 
reflects the needs and interests of the more powerful class of men, thereby 
unjustly diminishing women's equality and liberty._ The remedy lies in forming 
the law more in accordance with v.,omen's needs and interests. However, as 
with any broad concept , the substance of "women's needs and interests" in 
any particular situation is difficult to define . 107 The definition of substantive 
liberty or equality varies among the members of the class of women according 
to circumstances other than gender. 108 Consequently , there is a problem: how 
are we to choose a definition? 109 
One way to choose- a method that should be rejected-is to repeat the 
activity that was the initial focus of feminist attention: that is, to accept legal 
concepts that are defined in terms of the needs and interests of a more 
powerful class of people. Feminists have been ,criticized for doing this and 
have learned from the criticism. 110 In addition to a substantive commitment 
to gender equality and liberty, feminist legal thought now contains a procedural 
commitment to preserving liberty and equality in the process of defining these 
concepts . 
Recognition of the affirmative value of diverse perspectives underli es the 
feminist procedural commitment. The characteristic urge of individuals in 
defining legal concepts is to ignore conflicting perspectives and to define their 
own perspective as universally shared. m To preserve the freedom of all 
105. See, e.g., Slate v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 459 (1868) ("We will no more interfere 
where the husband whips the wife than where lhe wife whips lhe husband .... "). 
106. See JUDITH Bt.rrLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF lOEl'<"TITY 4 (1990) 
(noting "the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from 'women' 
whom feminism claims to represent"); Clare Dalton, supra note 86, at 7 ("(N]o single feminist narrative 
or theory should imagine that it can speak univocally for all women."). 
107. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Gening It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 47, 50 (1988) 
(" Any claim to speak from women's point of view, or to use women as a reference point, threatens to 
obscure [the multiplicity of women's points of view] by representing a particular view as the view of all."). 
108. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BEJUCELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989) (discussing how feminist theorists often nealect the distinctive perspective of 
lesbians); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginallzing the bttersection of Race and Sex, 1989 U. on. LEGAL 
F. 139 (noting how feminist theorists often ii'lore different racial perspectives); Angela P. Harris, Race 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 SrAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (same). 
109. Essentially, this is lhe dilemma of feminist epistemoloe}'. Set generally Susan H. Williams, 
Feminist Legal Eplstemclogy, 8 BBRKELEYWOMEN's L.J. 63 (1993) (analyzing feminist attempts to bridge 
lhe gap between social constructivism and the defense of feminist values). 
110. See, e.g., Minow, supra note \07. 
111. See Bartlett, supra note 70, al 882 ("[The] requirement that other perspectives be souaht out and 
examined checks the characteristic tendency of all individuals- including feminists-to want to stamp their 
own point of view upon the world."); Minow, supra note 107, at 5\ ("Cognitively, we need simplifying 
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individuals, any system of defining legal concepts must check this urge to 
privilege the perspectives of the more powerful. In particul ar, "the key to 
increasing knowledge lies in the effort to extend one's limited perspective" by 
attempting to "identify and understand the perspectives of others. " 112 No 
observer can completely transcend her own perspective, so no legal definition 
can be completely separate from the circumstances of the decisionmakers. 113 
But some definitions can be more inclusive than others and thereby have 
greater claims to be adopted as the legal definition that applies to all. 114 
Feminists have therefore recognized that paying attention to diversity of 
perspective is a crucial part of defining and justifying legal concepts. 
B. Application of Feminist Legal Insights 
Feminist insights into the concept of neutrality directly apply to the 
jurisprudence of the religion clauses, where government neutrality toward 
religion is the "preeminent goal. " 115 The concept of government neutrality 
as it is now used by the Court is meant to invoke impartiality and 
evenhandedness, in the sense that government decisions are made without 
respect to whether they advance or inhibit religious belief or practice. 116 
Implicitly, the Court holds up this ideal of perspectiveless government 
decisionmaking as possible and desirable. But it is impossible for the 
government to act without a perspective on religion. Like gender identification 
and the assumptions that go with it, religious identity and its accompanying 
assumptions are inextricable components of our individual and collective \Wrld 
views. Government decisions inevitably will reflect these perspectives. 
The laws that the Court has recently characterized as "neutral" reflect 
majority religious assumptions. This characteristic is most obvious in laws that 
the Court has reviewed under the free exercise clause. Including peyote in a 
broad list of illegal controlled substances" 7 ffil\kes sense only from the point 
of view of those who do not recognize its religious significance. Similarly, 
categ~ries·; and the ~fy ing category of 'woman' helps to organize experiertce, even at the cost of denying 
some of it."). 
112. Bartlett, supro note 70, at 881-82. 
113. Su Rhode, supra note 74, at 626 ("[AJII perspectives are partial, but some are more incomplete 
than others. "). 
114. Su Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICK. L. REV. 1187 (1993) (arguiqg 
that a dialogic methodology that includes different perspectives and regulates power disparities has a greater 
claim to objectivity than a less inclusive methodology). 
115. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 616 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
116. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Y,· Qty of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 221.7 ( 1993) ("[l)f 
tlile object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law 
is not neutral .•.. "); Zobrest v. Catalina Footpills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466 (1993) (neutral 
government programs provide benefits "to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion"). 
117. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). But see Drug Enforcement Administration 
Special Exempt Persons, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1994)(exemptingtheNativeAmericanChurch from federal 
laws prohibiting use of peyote). 
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prohibiting military members from wearing head coverings indoors118 or 
requiring federal aid applicants to obtain a social security number119 are rules 
that developed from a majority religious perspective that did not recognize a 
possible religious conflict. 
. The "neutral" label is also deceptive as applied to generally applicable 
programs that the Court has reviewed under the establishment clause. By and 
large, mainstream religious groups benefit disproportionately from such 
programs. One reason for this is that religious entities or practitioners can 
benefit from government aid only if they are organized so as to take advantage 
of the benefit. So, for example, religious organizations that own property will 
benefit from property tax exemptions, 120 religious groups with the critical 
mass to warrant a student group will benefit from provisions that require equal 
access to school facilities, 121 and more familiar forms of religious 
contribution may be eligible for tax deductions while less familiar forms may 
not. 122 Moreover, the government may "neutrally" employ religious entities 
to transmit its messages, even though majority religious organizations will be 
more likely to share the government's philosophy. 123 
Labelling these government actions "neutral" cJnly makes sense from the 
majority standpoint that views the religious perspective from which the rules 
were made as "normal" or "natural." Feminist insights point out the stigma 
attached to deviating from the accepted norm. The same is true with respect 
to the majority religious norms. According to the Court, a constitutional 
standard that led to exemptions for minority religious adherents from general 
applicable rules would be "a constitutional anomaly. " 124 
The Court's conflation of neutrality and impartiality is therefore deceptive 
and dangerous. It privileges majority norms while purporting to effectuate 
religious freedom. '.fhe Court defines government actions as neutral when it 
finds that the government did not specifically intend to benefit or burden 
religious practice. Under this interpretation, the clauses protect against burdens 
on religion which government decisionmakers know about or can anticipate. 
But government decisionmakers are most likely to be aware of burdens on 
majority religious practices. Majority religious organizations, with more 
connections to non-religious organizations, are also more likely to be 
"incidental" beneficiaries of ostensibly neutral government programs. 
Conversely, minority religious practices are more likely to be unwittingly 
burdened by government actions, and less likely to be benefitted by 
118. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503(1986}. 
119. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
120. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970}. 
121. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990}; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981}. 
122. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (upholding denial of tax exemption for certain 
payments to Church of Scientology). 
123. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (holding that funding for counseling on 
teenage sexuality may go to religious organizations). 
124. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. · 
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government actions not specifically directed at religion. The focus on neutrality 
as lack of conscious intent to discriminate therefore rewards willful ignorance 
of minority religious beliefs on the part of government decisionmakers with 
less constitutional scrutiny. 125 Thus, although it uses the reassuring language 
of neutrality, the Court has interpreted neutrality to encourage and protect 
deeply rooted majority religious assumptions. Feminist analysis, in contrast, 
values the redemption of the excluded perspective. 
Compounding the majo~itarian bias in government actions is the use of a 
majority religious perspective in judicial review. Where laws are not neutral 
according to the Court's definition, the Court asks whether the explicit 
recognition of religious entities or practitioners lifts a burden otherwise 
imposed by the government on the religious practice, or if not, whether the 
government action is a mere acknowledgment of religion rather than one that 
coerces or endorses religious belief. Both of these judicial inqu iries reveal a 
majority perspective. 
Governmental actions which appear to deliberately benefit religion may 
escape unconstitutionality if the Court determines that the action in fact restores 
the free exercise of a religion previously burdened by some other governmental 
practice. The inquiry into previous burdens, however, is formal in the same 
way that the Court's neutrality inquiry is formal. The Court looks for laws that 
explicitly prohibit mandatory religious practices, often ignoring the more 
subtle, but pervasive, background of state-sanctioned social, economic, and 
political actions that disproportionately burden particular religions or religious 
practice generally. 
Where the government advantages religion without lifting a preexisting 
burden, the Court again unwittingly privileges majority religious perspe ctives 
while purporting to guarantee religious liberty for all . . The tests that the Court 
most frequently applies in this situation depend upon the perceptions of those 
affected by the action. 126 Through these tests , at least some members of the 
Court have attempted to adopt · a different point of view from a majority 
religion adherent, forcing themselves to examine the perceptions of a 
reasonable nonadherent. 127 Proponents of the endorsement test have argued 
that the critical inquiry is whether the governmental action is '"sufficiently 
likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an 
endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual 
religious choices. ,,,m Similarly, a majority of the Court held a non-
125. Cf. Barbara J. Fla&&, "Was Blind, But Now I Su": White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory INent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 989 (1993) ("Invalidating only conscious 
racism provides an incentive for whites to repress and deny whatever racist attitudes they in fact harbor.~). 
126. See s11pra text accompanying notes 63~8 (describing the endorsement and coercion tests) . 
127. See Minow, supra note 75, at 47-49 (noting and praisina this effort by the Court to expand its 
perspective). 
128. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting School 
Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)); see also id. at 631 (O'Connor, J. , concurring) 
("The question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a reasonable observer would view [a 
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denominational high school graduation prayer unconstitutional because "a 
reasonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise 
signified her own participation or approval of it." 129 
Although this exercise expands the Court's perspective to a certain extent, 
ultimately it results in homogenization rather than encouragement of religious 
diversity. Certainly, the inquiry encourages the Court to adopt a non-majority 
point of view. But basing the constitutionality of government action on a 
nonadherent's perception compels the Court to define that perception; the 
Court declares what perceptions are "reasonable" 130 and what message 
viewers "may fairly understand" 131 to be endorsed through government 
action. The purpose of employing the nonadherent's perspective is to prevent 
nonadherents from being told "that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community . .,uz By its very nature, however, a test that defines the 
"reasonable" or "objective" perspective of a nonadherent defines other points 
of view as not "fair understandings" 133 or, less gently, as "ludicrous. "134 
By declaring and adopting the point of view of the reasonable nonadherent, 
the Court expands the circle of people who comprise the political community 
but keeps the idea of the circle intact. Defining reasonable and unreasonable 
religious perceptions. the Court makes judgments about the validity of religious 
beliefs while ostensibly being careful not to make such judgments. 135 
Defining standards in accordance with reasonable perceptions is not unique 
to the jurisprudence of the religion clauses; this exercise is basic to lawmaking 
and judicial review. Laws are standards that presumptively reflect the 
reasonable perceptions of a majority of the relevant population. Moreover, in 
interpreting the law, j udges routinely rely upon standards based on reasonable 
community perceptions. A good example is the "reasonable person" standard 
in tort law. Application of this standard determines in large part whether 
individuals can be held liable for their harm-causing conduct. Since juries by 
and large apply the reasonable person standard, every determination ofliability 
is in part a statement of community perceptions as to whether the defendant 
behaved reasonably. 
But the very function of the reason~ble person standard in tort law is to 
evaluate certain behavior and beliefs about appropriate behavior. The 
possibility of being subject to a jury's determination of reasonableness also 
shapes parties' future behavior and their beliefs about the consequences of that 
practice) as a disapproval of his or her particular religious choices.") (citation omitted). 
129. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992). 
130. Id. 
131. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668. 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
132. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688; see Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
133. See Lynch, 465 U .. S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
134. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
135. Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S . 872, 887 (1990) (stating that ~courts must not presume 
to determine the place of a particular belief in a relieion or the plausibility of a religious claim" while 
holding that state may prohibit sacramental peyote use). 
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behavior. The function of the reasonab le person standard is normative; it is 
designed in part to deter behavior that is perceived by a majority of the 
community to be unreasonable. 
Unlike the reasonable person standard, the putative purpose of the religion 
clauses is not to set behavioral norms, but to preserve a space for individual 
decisions. 136 Individual choice and volition are crucial to the value of the 
interest protected. In this context, judicial declarations of reasonable conduct 
or majoritarian perceptions of conduct have an impact on the very value to be 
protected. While not overtly punishing unreasonable perceptions, judicial 
declarations of reasonable perceptions affect religious belief, privileging some 
perspectives as reasonable and marginalizing others as unreasonable. 
The Court's review of government actions reveals majority religious 
assumptions in another way. In upholding government use of religious symbols 
and practices, the Court has reasoned that the long-term and widespread use 
of the symbol or the context in which it appears can secularize it and render 
it less offensive to nonobservers. 137 Yet women's experience calls into 
question the conclusion that long-term and pervasive use of a symbol somehow 
renders it benign. 138 The historically pervasive use and acceptance of gender 
roles has deeply entrenched those roles and rendered them less tractable; they 
certainly have not become less oppressive by being long and deeply held. The 
same insight applies to government sponsorship of religious symbols. From 
the point of view of the non-adherent, the long-term use and pervasiveness of 
the symbol may well render it more offensive rather than less so and thereby 
heighten the threat to religious freedom. Using the American religious tradition 
to justify the continuation of public religious practices begs the question in the 
same way that using a tradition of discrimination to justify its continuation does.139 
136. Su, e.g., Smilh, 494 U.S. at 877"("The free exercise of religion means .. . the right to believe 
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires."). 
137. See County of Alleiheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 585 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Chanukah, 
like Oiristmaa, is a cultural event as well as a religious holiday."): id. at S96 n.46 (referring to "ceremonial 
deism"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (noting that cr~he instills "a friendly community 
spirit of good will in keeping with the season"); id. at 693 (O'Connor, 1., concurring) ("(G]overnment 
aclcnowledements of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate 
secular purposes of solemnizin& public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging 
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society."): School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
303-04 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurrina) (noting that invocations of a deity in patriotic exercises such as 
the Pledae of Allegiance "no longer have a religious purpose or meanina"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 444 (1961) (upholding Sunday-<:losina laws on grounds that they had lost their religiow 
sienificance). 
138. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Introduction: 1he Art of the Impossible, in FEMINISM 
Ut.'MODIFIED 9 (1987) ("Gender inequality pervades the way we thinlc. "); Leslie S. Gielow, Note, Sex 
Discrimination In Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REV. 443, 447-49 (1985) ("Socioloiical studies confirm that 
sex-role expectations pervade society (and) result in neeative reactions to those who do not conform and 
also result in individuals being evaluated on different criteria according to sex.") (citations omitted). 
139. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). This is not to say that the 
Supreme Court has never enp.ged in such question begging. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-
94 & n.6 (1986) (citing criminalization of sodomy at time of ratification of Fourteenth Amendment to 
support holding that it is not a fundamental right worthy of constitutional protection); Bradwell v. Illinois, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (holding state may bar women from the 
practice of law because women traditionally thought unfit for occupations of life). 
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It is necessary to focus on the effect of government actions as well as their 
intent in order to change government actions that ignore and thereby 
subordinate minority religious interests. And a judicial determination of 
perspective is not a reliable or appropriate guide to measure that effect. But 
then how are we to define religious freedom and gauge the constitutionality 
of government actions that affect religious belief and practice? 
Although feminist legal insights insist that in examining questions under 
the religion clauses we pay attention to the actual effect of government actions 
as well as to their intent, this attention itself does not yield religious freedom. 
Rather , by paying attention to both intentions and effects, we will complicate 
the determination of what constitutes religious freedom in a particular 
circumstance by revealing impacts on religious freedom that a more formal 
analysis obscures. Additionally, the impacts on the .. religious freedom of various 
entities and individuals will be in conflict with one another . Guaranteeing the 
equality of some people will diminish the liberty of others, at least as they 
perceive it. 140 What is required is a conception of religious freedom that can 
reconcile these competing and conflicting equality and liberty interests. 141 
Feminist legal insights can facilitate the reconciliation. Feminist legal 
thinking has long maintained that individual liberty requires some degree of 
equality. In ract, the focus of feminist legal efforts is often thought to be the 
achievement of gender equality. But at the same time, the push for gender 
equality has established that liberty is a necessary component in the pursuit of 
equality. Because equality can mean different things in. different situations, a 
choice as to the meaning is required, even among feminists. But it is incorrect 
and damaging to the very goal of equality to project any chosen meaning of 
equality as universally shared. To rail to acknowledge that any chosen meaning 
represents only a partial understanding is to silence those who do not share that 
meaning. Thus, it is critical that we preserve for all the freedom to have 
unique and different perspectives if we are to achieve the feminist goal of 
gender equality. 
A similar emphasis on the value of the diversity of perspectives should 
underpin the jurisprudence of the religion clauses. 142 Recognition of this 
140, Cf. RONALD DWORX!N, TAXINO RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269-70 {1977) (arguing that the tension 
between liberty and equality is often false because there is no right to liberty, defined as complete freedom 
from government action). 
141. See Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing The Heavenly and Eanhly Spheres: The FragmtJll(lt/on 
and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Cons1/1wton; Sl OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 93 (1990) ("The 
key to understanding the religion clauses is to recogniie th[e] iension and accept the fact that the 
establishment and free e,i:ercise clauses represent one additional battlefield in the war between liberty and 
equality inlerests which is fought throughout the Constitution.~). 
142. Inierpretation of the religion clauses in fact presents a particularly appropriate example of the 
dilemma in feminist legal thought between preserving liberty and ensuring equality. Preserving liberty of 
religious perspective often means protecting the private, unfette.red operation of religious institutions. 
Women's experience demonstrates, however, that protecting private arrangements from government scrutiny 
may often perpetuate private oppression. Religious organizations, like other private arrangements, are 
largely male-<:ontrolled. Mary Becker, 1he Politics ef Women's Wrongs and the Bill of ·Righls": A 
Bicentennial Penpeaive, S9 U. Cm. L. REV. 453, 459 (1992). The religion clauses have therefore not 
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value, combined with other feminist insights , can lead to a meaningful and 
consistent definition of religious freedom. 
The goal of preserving the diversi ty of perspectives requires that the 
inquiry examine the effects of ostensibly neutral government actions. In the 
context of the establishment clause, getting beyond the facial neutrality of 
government aid and scrutinizing its effects would require first that we 
determine who actually benefits from the government aid and in what ways 
they benefit. Similarly , under the free exercise clause, the Court would need 
to ask who is burdened by a government action that is not specifica lly directed 
at religion and how heavy the burden s are. 
In an inquiry under either clause, the status quo ante of the religious 
entities or practitioners affected by a government action would neces sarily be 
relevant. Under the free exercise clause, minority religious status should lead 
to a presumpti on that exemption from an otherwise applicable ·1aw is 
constitutionally required. In establishment clause analysis, the same level of 
aid to a majority religion might have a much greater silencing effect on 
minority religions than if the situation were reversed. Because the impact on 
religious diversity is the touchstone , the different treatment would be consistent 
with the aim of constitutional neutral ity. 
Although it is easie r not to pay attention to the nature and magnitude of 
the impact of a government action, the effect of th is inattention is to place 
disproportionate burdens on less powerful religious entities and practitioners. 
Nor does it signal judicial hostility towards majority religious beliefs to base 
decisions in part on the minority status of those to be burdened by government 
action where the decision might have been different if the burden ed party was 
the majority religious group. 143 Rather, such an approach is a necessary 
antidote to the natural advantage that more powerful religions have in the 
political proces.s and in society in general, and to the conscious and 
unconscious majority assumptions that create the context of government 
decisionmaking and judic ial review. 
This attention to the social and political status of religious entities and 
practitioners is also appropriate when the question is whether the government 
may intentionally confer a benefit even where no government legislation 
empowered women to develop "an autonomous source of authority, meaning, value, and morality 
independent of the state" as they have empowered men. Id. at 484. Rather, pro1ecting religious 
organizations from government scrutiny and regulation may often perpetuate gender roles and attitudes thal 
conflict with individual liberty and equality for women. Id. at 454; see also Robin West, supra note IOI, 
at 452. Many women, however, disagree with this assessment of organized religion. See, e.g., Brief 
Amicu.s Curiae of Concerned Women for America in Support of Petitioners at I, County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (Nos. 87-2050, 88-90, 88-96) (1989) (citina purpose of CWA to "preserve, protect 
and promote traditional and Judeo-Christian values• and advocating reduced government intervention into 
activities of private religious organizations). 
143. Justices have disagreed with this claim. See, e.g., Alleghcly, 492 U.S. at 6TI (KeMedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing a rule whereby "(!)hose religions enjoying the largest 
following must be consigned to the starus ofleast favored'faiths so as to avoid any possible risk of offending 
members of minorily religions."). 
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explicitly imposes a burden. Because the line between lifting a burden on 
religious practice and conferring a benefit is difficult to discern, a focus on 
the impact of the government action, with special attention paid to the status 
of the religious entities or practitioners affected, would provide the Court with 
more reliable guidance. For example, finding a goveniment-sponsored menorah 
display constitutional, while invalidating a similar creche display, may be 
explicitly justified by reference to the minority political status of Judaism and 
the fact that the societal celebration of the winter holiday season is skewed to 
correspond to Christian religious practice. Similarly, the constitutionality of 
aid to parochial schools might depend not upon whether the aid flows directly 
or through an intermediary, but upon the effect of the aid. The Court should 
investigate whether the aid enhances the power of the already powerful or 
empowers religious entities or practitioners whose perspectives are not socially 
and politically reinforced. 
Of course, the Court will have to engage in some difficult line drawing if 
it is to be guided by the goal of preserving religious diversity. Difficult 
questions will arise. R>r example, does allowing a Christian student Bible 
study group access to school rooms on an equal basis with other student groups 
enhance or inhibit religious diversity? Though Christianity is the majority 
religion in most contexts, it has been said that the public school curriculum 
embodies the secular. A principled decision grounded in a commitment to 
preserve religious diversity could go either way. A focus on the amount and 
impact of the aid, however, might well help such an equal access policy to 
pass constitutional scrutiny. The Court could note that all that is to be provided 
is a meeting place, and that the government's association with the religious 
practice extends only to condoning it as an appropriate activity among many 
others. Moreover, the barriers to student entry would not be large. Therefore 
other nonmajority religious groups could reasonably be expected to take 
advantage of the access to school rooms and presumably could do so on an 
unlimited basis. 
The issue of government aid to private parochial schools is similarly 
difficult. Private parochial schools are disproportionately Catholic. While it 
is a branch of Christianity, Catholicism is more of a minority faith than the 
socially dominant Protestantism. This fact should make a difference in 
determining the constitutionality of government aid. Another fact that should 
affect the constitutional analysis, however, is that other minority religions may 
not be able to provide the elementary and secondary school education that 
Catholicism does. Government aid that has the effect of substantially 
privatizing a traditionally public activity will disadvantage these non-Catholic 
minorities. Consequently, the constitutionality of government aid should depend 
in part on a determination that it is not of such a magnitude to produce such 
an unacceptable effect. 
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In sum, the application of feminist insights to the jurisprudence of the 
religion clauses would result in conceptions of religious · freedom and 
government neutrality which are different from those currently held by the 
Court. If religious freedom requires preserving religious diversity, then 
neutrality must answer to the nature and magnitude of the impact of 
government actions on diverse groups. Government activity is not neutral 
simply because it appears so on its face. Where government action explicitly 
treats some religious entities or practitioners differently from the rest of the 
population, the difference between lifting a burden and conferring a benefit 
should not be crucial . 
Instead, the status of the religious entities or practitioners necessarily 
affected by the action should raise certain presumptions. Where apparently 
advantageous government action affects nonmajority groups or practitioner s, 
the presumption should be that the government action enhances religious 
freedom by preserving religious diversity. Where such advantageous action 
aims at benefiting majority groups, the presumption should be that it decreases 
religious freedom. Where the government action ostensibly imposes a burden, 
the presumptions should be the opposite. Any workable rule will require that 
these presumptions be rebuttable upon a showing that the actual effect of the 
government action on minority religious groups is such as to overcome the 
presumption. This aspect of the rule will require fact-specific determinations 
in each case. But the presumptions and the underlying goal of preserving 
religious diversity provide starting points for the explanation, justification, and 
critical examination of the issues and the decision in each case. 
m. Bo.ARD OF EDUCA170N OF KIRYAS JOEL VIUAGE SCHOOL D1snucr V. 
GRUMET 
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has applied the religion 
clauses is Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. 
Grwnet. 1" In this decision, the Court reiterated and applied a number of the 
religion clause themes discussed above. 
The controversy in Grumet stemmed from the New York legislature's 
decision to enact a statute creating a school district coterminous with the 
boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel. The residents of Kiryas Joel are all 
members of the Satmar Hasidic religious sect. The legislature apparently 
enacted the statute because the Village residents and the local school district 
had reached an impasse with regard to the provision of special education for 
Kiryas Joel children with disabilities. 
Almost all of the children in the Village are educated at private sex-
segregated religious schools which are not equipped to provide special 
education. Under federal and state law, handicapped children are en~tled to 
M4. 114 s. Ct. 2481 (1994). 
164 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 7: 137 
special education services even when . enrolled in private schools. 145 Starting 
in 1984, the school district of which the Village was initially a part provided 
special education in an annex to one of the Village's private schools. However, 
in two 1985 cases, the Supreme Court held that public employees could not 
constitutionally provide such services on parochial school premises. 146 In 
response to these decisions, the local school district discontinued the provision 
of special education on the private school premises and began providing the 
special education for Kiryas Joel children at public schools located outside the 
Village. 
Kiryas Joel parents soon objected to the new arrangement, claiming that 
their children suffered emotional trauma when educated in these schools. 147 
Ultimately, all . but one of the children were removed from the special 
education program. 148 The New York legislature enacted the statute at issue 
in Grumet to respond to these problems and serve the needs of the Satmar 
children of Kiryas Joel. The statute authorized the "qualified voters" of the 
Village to exercise "all the powers and duties of a union free school 
district." 149 
Pursuant to its new statutory authority, the Village established one special 
educational school within the Village boundaries. 150 All nonhandicapped 
students remained within the private schools . The new school and its 
curriculum were public, and the teachers came from outside the Village . . The 
schoo l served forty full-time students, over half of whom came from outside 
the district, and approximately one hundred part-t ime parochial school students 
from the Village. All of the students that the school served belonged to the 
Satmar Hasidic sect. 
The lawsuit arose when the New York State School Board Association and 
several citizen-taxpayers challenged the statute, arguing that it constituted an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion. 151 A majority of the Justices 
agreed. The Court opened its analysis by noting that both religion clauses 
"compel[ ] the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion. "151 
The statute, it held, "depart[ed) from ~is constitutional command by 
delegating the State's discretionary authority . . . to a group defined by its 
character as a religious community. "u 3 
· 1"4S. 114 S. Ct. at 248S (citini Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 
(1988 ed. & Supp. IV); N.Y. EDUC. LAW, ART. 89 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994). 
146. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (l98S); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373 (1985). 
147. 114 S. Ct. at 2485. 
148. Id. at 2486. 
149. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 1989 N. Y. Laws, ch. 748). 
150. The new school district never established any other schools, as the other children within the 
district remained at their parochial schools. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 2487. 
153. Id. 
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The Court reasoned that "the distinction between a government's purposeful 
delegation on the basis of religion and a delegation on principles neutral to. 
religion" was a crucial one.U4 The statute was not deemed to be one that 
permissibly "accommodate[s] religious needs by alleviating special 
burdens ... m Rather, the Court held that the Satmars sought and received "an 
adjustment to [their] religiously grounded preferences that [the Court's] cases 
do not countenance. "156 Whereas "[p]rior decisions have allowed religious 
communities and institutions to pursue their own interests free from 
government interference," they have not allowed government to "single[ ] out 
a particular religious sect for special treatment. " 157 This latter action raised 
the critical constitutional question as to "whether the benefit received by the 
Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other 
religious (and noD!eligious) groups." "' Moreover, the Court explained, it 
was "no less a constitutional problem" that the "benefit flows only to a .. . 
single, small religious group. " 159 The Court stated that "the general 
availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals" is the 
principle the Court will invoke to "turn[ ] aside Establishment Clause 
challenges. "160 
Finally, the fact that the statute referred to the "qualified voters" of the 
Village, as opposed to a religious group per se, did not save it from 
constitutional invalidity. The distinction, according to the Court, was "one of 
form, not substance. " 161 The "analysis does not end with the text of the 
statute at issue" when "the context ... effectively identifies the[ ] recipients 
of governmental authority by reference to doctrinal adherence, even though 
[the statute] does not do so expressly. " 162 
Moreover, the Court held that although the legislative establishment of a 
separate school district violated the establishment clause, constitutional 
alternatives to address the needs of the handicapped Satmar children did exist. 
The Court explained that because "the Satrnars. do not claim that separatism 
is religiously mandated," special education could be provided by a public 
school outside of the Vtllage. 163 The local school district might also provide 
a separate special education program for the Village children at "a neutral site" 
near one of the Village's private schools. 164 
1S4. Id. at 2489. 
155. Id. at 2492. 
156. Id. at 2492-93 (footnote omitted). 
157. Id. at 2493. 
158. Id. at 2491. 
159. Id. at 2492. 
160. Id. at 2491. 
161. Id. at 2488. 
162. Id. at 2489. 
163. Id. at 2493. See also id. at 2492 n. 9 ("[T]he Satmars prefer lo live together 'to facilitate 
individual religious observance and maintain social, cultural and religious values,' but ... it is not 'against 
their religion' to interact with others.") (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.l, Grumet (No. 9'.l-517)). 
164. The Court's previous holding that public funding of classes on parochial school premises violates 
the establishment clause led the local school district to abandon this type of special education in the Village 
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In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that the Court's 
"emphasis on equal treatment is ... eminently sound. " 165 She distinguished 
"permissible, even praiseworthy" accommodations, which may involve 
"treating those who share [a] belief differently from those who do not," from 
"discriminations based on sect. " 166 By O'Connor's reasoning, a state law 
may exempt sacramental wine from a general prohibition on alcohol 
consumption, but may not constitutionally exempt such use by a particular 
religious sect. O'Connor noted that although it presented a "close question," 
the statute at issue was not "a general accommodation," but "single[d] out a 
particular religious group for favorable treatment. "167 She was concerned that 
the legislature retained discretion to deny similar requests made by other 
religious groups. Given the possibility of such disparate treatment of religious 
groups by the legislature, Justice O'Connor considered the validation of this 
particular religious preference to be "dangerous. "168 By contrast, she argued, 
"a generally applicable scheme" that "set[s] forth neutral criteria that a village 
must me~t to have a school district of its own . . . would be acceptable even 
though it coincides with a village which was consciously created by its voters 
as an enclave for their religious group. "169 
Justices Kennedy and Scalia both analyzed the statute as an 
"accommodation," which alleviated a "burden" on the religious practices of 
a minority sect, although Justice Kennedy wrote in concurrence and Justice 
Scalia wrote in dissent. Kennedy reasoned that "the Establishment Clause 
forbids the government to use religion as a line-drawing criterion. " r'° Justice 
Scalia considered the government to be accommodating "religious practices" 
that he viewed as being more precisely "cultural peculiarities. "171 He also 
placed great weight in his analysis on the facial neutrality of the statute, which 
delegated authority to the Village voters rather than delegating it explicitly to 
a religious entity. In Scalia's view, "when there is no special treatment there 
is no possibility of religious favoritism. "m But even when there is such 
special treatment, Scalia maintained, this fact is not dispositive in proving that 
an action is unconstitutional. In fact, Scalia reasoned, in accommodating 
religious practice, a legislature usually "seeks to solve a problem that applies 
to members of only one or a few religions" 173 and "'follows the best of our 
traditions'" when it does so. 174 
and to require attendance at schools outside the Village. See id. at 2496 (O'Connor, I., concurring) (citing 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball , 473 U.S. 373 (19&5)). 
165. Id. at 2497. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 2497-98. 
168. Id. at 2498. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
171. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissentina). 
172. Id. at 2510. 
173. Id. al 2513. 
174. Id. at 2511-12 (quoting Zorach v. Oausen, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (19S2)). 
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A. A Feminist Critique of the Coun's Analysis 
As in almost all of its decisions under the religion clauses, the Supreme 
Court's articulated goal in Grwnet_ is government neutrality. The facts of the 
case, howeve_r, indicate how difficult it can be to define neutrality, and how 
difficult it can be to achieve it. The situation of the Village of Kiryas Joel 
illustrates vividly that government neutrality, in the sense of impartiality 
toward religious belief, is impossible in the context of public schoo ling. 
One direct cause of conflict in this context is that the public school 
curriculum itself is inconsistent with some religiou s beliefs. Apart from any 
specific school subject matters, the more general "public interest in promoting 
diversity and undei:standing in the public schoo ls" 175 is compatib le with most 
mainstream religious and nonreligious world views, but not with some min ority 
systems of religious belief. 176 Even for religious communiti es that are not 
directly opposed to understanding and tolerating ways different from their own , 
the impact on religious liberty which will result from engaging in this type of 
education is likely to differ according to the size of the affected community. 
It is much easier, for example, for large religious groups to be "to lerant " and 
to expose their children to diversity in school because the dangers of 
assimilation are much less pronounced for them than they are for members of 
small religious communities. 
This concern about assimilation relates directly to the claim made by the 
Kiryas Joel Satmars in Grumet. Becau se of its size and the variances between 
its social, political, and familial norm s and those of the majority, the Satrnar 
community is obviously quite cognizant of the dangers of assimilation. In 
addition, because the gulf between the Satmars' way of life and that of the 
majority is so wide, Satmar children are argua bly distinctively susceptible to 
assimilationist forces in public school. Therefore, the impa ct of required 
diversified public schooling on the religious freedom of the Satmars is different 
from the impact on members of more mainstream religious faiths. 
The Court recognized this type of claim when it was made by an Amish 
community in 1963. 177 In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Amish sought to exempt 
their children from the last two years of compulsory high school education 
because this level of education "interpose[d ] a serious barrier to the integration 
of the Amish child into the Amish religious comm unity. " 171 In holding in 
favor of the Amish free exercise clause claim, the Court noted the "hydraulic 
insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards" that the "requirements of 
17S. Id. at 249S (Stevens, J., concurring). 
176. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1973) ("In the Amish belief higher learning tends 
IO develop values they reject as influences that alienate man from God."); Naomi Maya Stolzenbera, "He 
Drew A Circle Thal Shllt Me Out": Assimilation, lndoctrin01ion, and the Paradox ofa Uberal Education, 
106 HARV. L. REV. S81 (1993) (discussing the claims of some minority religious communities that the 
values of diversity and tolerance t.au&ht in public schools undermined thei.r faiths). 
177. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
178. Id. at 211-12. 
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contemporary society" can impose upon a small religious sect devoted to a way 
of life in conflict with widely accepted societal norms. 179 By contrast, in 
Grumet, the Court found that the 'School district plan did not conflict with the 
Satmars' religious freedom because "separatism is [not] religiously 
mandated. "180 This view overlooked the more subtle and pervasive influences 
that , although not in direct conflict with Satmar religious practice, might be 
equally damaging to any meaningful religious freedom for the Satmars. The 
Court has built into its analysis in this context an unstated preference for a 
public school model which is consistent with the majority religious and 
nonreligious norm. 
The emphasis the Court places on equal treatment further reinforces this 
unstated preference for majority norms. Once the norm of treatment has been 
adjusted to reflect certain preferences , then equal treatment with respect to 
those norms begins to advance these built -in preferences. The preferences 
which were initially excluded in determining what the norms should be remain 
unaddressed and effectively marginalized. Thus the treatment that the Satmars 
seek is "special" only in the sense that the handicapped education plan adopted 
by the local school district has been modelled according to the majority world 
views. 181 
Because it judged equal treatment according to a majority norm, the Court 
viewed the Satmars as receiving special advantageous treatment , which under 
the establishment clause is particularly suspect . By contrast, the Court 
characterized the Amish claim in Yoder as a claim that the Constitution 
required that the Amish be exempt from a requirement which, while neutral 
on its face, was a significant burden on Amish religious practice. Therefore 
the Court reviewed the claim under the free exercise clause, under which 
differential treatment based upon religious beliefs is constitutionally sound. In 
both cases, however, the claimant needed affirmative government action to 
obtain its'objective . The Amish desired a constitutionally mandated exemption; 
the Satmars desired special legislative action. The current Court has expressed 
its inclination to defer to legislative actions. The Court's perception in Grumet, 
then, that the Satmars received a benefit from government action rather than 
simply seeking to be left alone must be seen as crucial. 
This way of characterizing the Grumet decision, however, reveals the 
majoritarian bias in the Court's review. Whether a government action is said 
to lift a burden on religious practice or to confer a benefit upon it depends 
upon the perspective from which the action is viewed. Like other citizens, the 
Satmars paid taxes that funded public handicapped education. The manner in 
which the school board provided that their children would receive such special 
· 179,,.Jd. ·at ln, · . ·· 
180. 114 S. Ct. at 2493. 
181. Su The Supreme Coun-Leodif!g Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 250, 256 (1994) (analyzing Grumet 
and noting that "equal treatment reinforces the majoritarian bias inherent in generally applicable laws"). 
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education affected their children and threatened their community 
disproportionately. This disproportionate impact stemmed from their particular 
religious beliefs and practices. From the Satmars' perspective, therefore, New 
York's statute did not confer a benefit above and beyond the benefits that other 
groups received. Rather, it lifted a burden that was pl.aced on the Satmars 
alone. Because the line between lifting a burden and_ conferring a benefit 
depends so crucially upon perspective, the line serves as an unreliable and 
inappropriate measure of the constitutionality of government action. 182 
The bias of judicial review of religion clalJSe cases is also apparent in the 
Court's willingness in Grumet to look qeyond the form of New York's action 
to its substance, a move that the Court is usually reluctant to make. In 
particular, Grumet demonstrates that the currept Court will look beyond the 
facial neutrality or'a government action when it suspects that government is 
intentionally treating some religious groups or practitioners differe ntly. Where 
it is not intentional or "purposeful" action that treats different relig ious groups 
differently, but only the impact of the action wpich creates the difference, that 
action's formal neutrality will ensure its constitutionality. While this deeper 
level of judicial review may help protect the religious freedom of less powerful 
groups and individuals when it is used to ferret out religious -based action that 
is disadvantageous to those "single [d] out, "113 it . has the opposite effect 
where the government action is advantageous to smaller, less mainstream 
religious groups. In Grumet, the Court invalidated the government action as 
being based unconstitutionally upon "religious identity. " 184 But in general , 
facially neutral programs which have the effect of disproportionately aiding 
some religious groups or practitioners, whomever they may be, will survive 
constitutional scrutiny. The current method which the Court employs to 
determine when the form of government action will contro l , and when the 
substance or real impacts of government action will control, can thus be 
disadvantageous to smaller, minority religious groups. These groups may need 
specific government attention and action to counteract legal presumptions that 
threaten their religious freedom. 
In numerous ways, the Court's decision in Grumet results in privileging 
the religious freedom of mainstre am religious groups and entities over that of 
small religious groups. Of course, one does not prove that New York's original 
plan is unconstitutional in the same stroke in which one reveals that it has a 
182. Justice O' Connor' s proposed distinction between accommodations and "discriminations based 
on sect" is similarly indetenninate. Id. at 2497. She would find an exemption from a aeneral prohibit.ion 
for sacramental wine to be constitutional and one that distinguished among the sects using it to be 
unconstitutional. But what about an exemption for wine but not for other prohibited drugs used in reliaious 
ceremonies? Justice O'Connor dissented from the Court's holdina that a similar distinction with respect 
to tax exemptions for religious contributions was constitutional. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 
680, 704 (1989) (O'Connor, J. , dissenting). Like other proposed distinctions. her distinction depends upon 
a classification whic'h in tum depends upon perceptions; such perceptions inevitably differ. 
183. 114 S. Ct. at 2493. 
184. Id. at 2489. 
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special burdensome impact on the Satmars. But in highlighting the impact in 
the context of the Court's reasoning, we do bring a critical view to bear upon 
the Court's conception of government neutrality and the ideal of religious 
freedom. ' 
B. Rewriting the Grumet Decision to Preserve Religious Diversity 
The question we want to ask is whether the Court's religious clause 
jurisprudence effectuates the ideal of preserving religious diversity that feminist 
legal thought recommends. Tu answer this question we must direct separate 
attention to the Court's analysis in Grumet and to the result of that analysis. 
A revised analysis which seeks to preserve religious diversity would differ 
from the Supreme Court's in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, the 
revised analysis would consider the minority status of the Satmars to be quite 
relevant, working from the presumption that the apparently beneficial New 
York legislative action works to preserve religious diversity. At the same time, 
drawing distinctions between lifting a burden on religious practice and 
conferring a benefit, _and between intentional and unintentional impacts on 
religious practice would not be critical in this analysis. Nor would the 
distinctions between equal treatment and special treatment, nor between 
government action and inaction, control the decision as to whether the State's 
action was unconstitutional. Instead, the inquiry would focus on the actual 
effects of the legislation with respect to the religious freedom of different 
religious groups. Specifically, in Grumet, where New York adopted special 
proactive measures, the question would be whether its actions fail to preserve 
religious diversity in a manner that is unconstitutional. 
To answer this question the Court would have to ascertain the effects of 
the statute that created the separate school district for the Village of Kiryas 
Joel, both on the religious freedom of the Satmars and of other individuals and 
groups. As the Court noted, the Satmars received treatment different from 
what would be expected under customary school districting policy. Although 
this special arrangement conflicts with the ideal of equal treatment, the Court 
should determine whether the different treatment serves to ensure a different 
type of equality, and whether the protection of this different type of equality 
is consistent with the preservation of religious diversity. 
The quest for equal treatment stems from our concern that "special 
treatrnent" 185 necessarily means government "favoritism. "186 Such 
favoritism is inconsistent with religious diversity when its effect is to burden 
religious groups or practitioners who do not receive the favorable government 
treatment. However, the fact that special government treatment is directed at 
a nonmajority religious group such as the Satmars increases the likelihood.that 
.,.; . . 
185. td: at 2493. 
186. Id. at 2491. 
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the government action achieves a different type of equality. In Grumet, this 
different type of equality is realized in a statute that ensures that both Satmars 
and non-Satmars can receive a special education for their handicapped children 
which does not offend their religious beliefs or impede their ability to freely 
practice their religion. 
Once we have identified this alternate vision of equality achieved through 
different government treatment, we must determine whether the government's 
action conflicts with the preservation of religious diversity. In this analysis the 
effect of the New York statute on the religious freedom of non-Satmars must 
be balanced against the Satmars' religious freedom that the statute helps to 
achieve. To be sure, the Grumet statute. diminishes somew hat the ability of 
non-Satmars to receive a public education in the company of a broad range of 
religious practitioners which would include Satmars. The question, however, 
is whether a desire for forced integration is of greater constitutional magnitude 
than the Satmars' desire to preserve their religious integrity . Contact can lead 
to greater understanding and acceptance. But it can also lead to assimilation 
and homogenization . A concern for preserving religious diversity counsels 
against a constitutional rule that forbids government from allowing religious 
groups to isolate themselves. Moreover, a determination in Grumet must be 
made in light of the particular context. Most Satmar children already attend 
private schoo ls. The isolation effected by the statu te only applies to 
handicapped education. Even this isolation preexisted the statute because most 
of the Satmars refu sed to send their handicapped children to the public schools. 
For these rea sons, the substantive equality achieved by the New York statu te 
in Grumet appears at least as likely to preserve the religious diversity that the 
religion clauses guarantee as a policy of equal treatment would. 
Several factors, if altered slightly, could change this constitutional analy sis. 
First, the result might be different if New York's statute appeared likely to 
cause substan tial factionalization and privatization of elementary and secondary 
education along religiou s lines . Although all relig ious groups theoretically 
would have equal license to form their own public schools, some groups would 
be more affected than other s by this privatization of a previously public 
activity. The se groups would be primarily small minority religious groups. 
Consequently, to the extent that state action aimed at preserving the religiou s 
freedom of one minority group would have this effect on other minority 
groups, it would be constitutio nally suspect. In Grumet, however , this effect 
does not appear sufficiently likely to warrant a finding that the statute is 
unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court could uphold the creation of the Kiryas 
Joel school district and still find a different specially created district to be 
unconstitutional in circumstances where substa ntial factionalization and 
privatization would seem to be the likely results . 
A second change that might affect the outcome of the constitutional analysis 
\\Quid be evidence of discriminatory application of the school districting 
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requirements to religious or nonreligious groups, that is, an application 
motivated by animus toward particular groups. The Court inyalidated New 
York's statute based in part on this possibility. But the question is whether a 
preemptive strike is necessary to achieve the goal of preserving religious 
diversity. It is certain that this type of discriminatory application would pose 
a real threat to the goal of preserving religious diversity, whether or not the 
religiou s groups favored were minorities . In a case in which the recipient of 
the special treatment is in fact a minority group, however, the better 
constitutional rule would be to engage in an analysis of the particular case and 
await a claim that such discriminatory action is actually occurring. The fact 
that the group which benefits from the government's action is presumably 
unable to control the political decisionmaking process should lessen the 
suspicion that would otherwise attach to discretionary government action that 
is based overtly upon religion. Furthermor e, as with the danger of extensive 
privatization of public sphere activities, the fact that one case arising under the 
statute does not involve discrimination does not mean that if proof of 
discrimination is offered in a different case involving the statute the Court 
would be powerless to declare that government action unconstitutional because 
of a conflict with the goal of preserving religious diversity. 
CONCLUSION 
Feminist legal insights are constantly developing and changing in response 
to the following question : What is freedom and how should we best attempt 
to achieve it? Because this same question is very much at issue in the 
interpretation of the religion clauses, feminist legal insights are an important 
aid to their meaning . The fundamental feminist recognition is that there is 
value in preserving a diversity of perspectives on any particular issue, even 
though those perspectives may be in great conflict. This recognition has 
significance for the jurisprudence of the religion clauses as well , where 
religious freedom for all is the goal. Any particular conception of religious 
freedom must yield to the value of preserving all conceptions. This value can 
guide the Court in its interpretation of both the establishment clause and the 
free exercise clause , thereby resolving the apparent tension between them. 
